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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the gender pay gap along the wage distribution using a detailed
decomposition approach based on unconditional quantile regressions. Non-randomness of the
sample leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the wage equation as well as of the com-
ponents of the wage gap. Therefore, the method is extended to account for sample selection
problems. The decomposition is conducted by using Italian microdata. Accounting for labor
market selection may be particularly relevant for Italy given a comparably low female labor
market participation rate. The results suggest not only differences in the income gap along
the wage distribution (in particular glass ceiling), but also differences in the contribution of
selection effects to the pay gap at different quantiles.
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1 Introduction
Gender differences in pay are a well-known phenomenon of modern labor markets. Despite
the promotion of equal-pay legislation and equal-pay opportunities, differences in pay between
men and women persist (Blau and Kahn, 1992, 2003, 2006; Goldin, 2014; Kahn, 2015; Blau
and Kahn, 2016). Adding to the broad literature on the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) research has
recently focused on the estimation of the wage gap beyond the mean (Albrecht et al., 2003;
Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005a, 2005b; Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Arulampalam et al.,
2007; Albrecht et al., 2009; Longhi et al., 2012; Xiu and Gunderson, 2014). Analyzing the GPG
along the wage distribution allows to gain additional insights compared to the mean estimation.
In particular, the phenomena of glass ceiling and sticky floors, i.e. more pronounced pay gaps
at the top and bottom of the wage distribution, have been revealed using quantile-regression
approaches. Hence, estimation beyond the mean allows to study gender wage inequality across
the wage distribution. The standard approach in modern labor economics when it comes to
decomposition methods is the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) method. Advantages of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are its relatively simple implementation and intuitive approach.1
In the literature, the unexplained component, i.e. the part due to differences in coefficients, is
thereby identified as a major contributor to the wage gap (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2016). A detailed
decomposition allows to gain information on the contribution of various personal, labor market
or job characteristics to the GPG. However, it implies additional functional form restrictions to
identify the various elements of the detailed decomposition. This holds in particular, when the
decomposition is conducted beyond the mean (Fortin et al., 2011; Longhi et al., 2012). A popular
approach is the method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) based on Conditional Quantile
Regression (CQR). The detailed decomposition, however, is path dependent, i.e. the order
of the decomposition matters (Fortin et al., 2011). Moreover, the method is computationally
intense as it calculates the entire conditional wage distribution and uses simulation techniques
to calculate the counterfactuals. Most importantly, the method based on standard CQRs does
not allow for the unconditional mean interpretation. The latter, however, is used in Oaxaca-
Blinder type decompositions. Despite the estimation beyond the mean, it is important to control
for group-specific sample selection. Indeed, gender differences occur when it comes to labor
market participation (Heckman, 1979). Biases due to differences between men and women in
the propensity to work may be important in determining the GPG and failure to account for
this bias may result in inaccurate and biased estimation of the gender-specific wage equations.
Consequently, also the components of the pay differential may be biased. The underlying study
is applied on Italian microdata. The Italian case is particularly interesting for the study of
sample selection as gender differences in labor market participation are particularly pronounced
in Italy. The female labor force participation in Italy amounted to 50.6% in 2015, while the
1The method is easy to implement as it is estimated via OLS and by decomposing the pay gap in an explained
and unexplained part, it provides an intuitive interpretation of the results.
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EU-28 average was at more than 64.0% in the same year (Eurostat, 2016). Albrecht et al.
(2009) extend the method by Machado and Mata (2005) to account for sample selection showing
that sample selection along the wage distribution is important when considering pay differences
between full- and part-time female employees in the Netherlands.
This paper uses linear Recentered Influence Function (RIF)-OLS regressions to estimate
Mincer-type wage equations for men and women (Firpo et al., 2009b). Estimation at specific
quantiles is thereby based on Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR).2 The method has the
advantage that it allows to compute a detailed decomposition in a path-independent way and
that it allows for the unconditional mean interpretation of the coefficient estimates.3 In case of
concerns of nonlineartiy, the method may be combined with a reweighting scheme. For robust-
ness, we apply the reweighting scheme proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) and show that the
results do not change significantly. The main part of the paper focuses on the extension of the
quantile-specific RIF-OLS decomposition to account for selection into employment. Thereby,
consistent estimates of the components of the GPG along the wage distribution are obtained.
The method by Firpo et al. (2009b) is one of the very few approaches allowing to conduct
detailed Oaxaca-Blinder type decompositions beyond the mean. Thereby, the model allows to
calculate the significance of gender differences in endowments as well as in coefficients at different
points of the wage distribution. In the extended model, the selection effect can be attributed to
the endowments and coefficients part, respectively, explicitly showing the contribution of (oth-
erwise) unobservable characteristics to the different parts of the GPG. The selection correction
terms are estimated using both parametric and semiparametric single-index models. The semi-
parametric binary choice models applied are the Ichimura (1993) and Klein and Spady (1993)
models. The parametric model estimates the incidence of employment via probit estimation.
Sample-selection bias correction is generally conducted via parametric regression models such
as maximum likelihood probit or logit, which assume normally distributed errors. However, dis-
tributional assumptions may play an important role in sample selection models (Martins, 2001).
Semiparametric binary choice estimators, such as the Ichimura and Klein-Spady estimator, do
not require any distributional assumptions. The semiparametric selection correction terms ob-
tained are then, via polynomial regression, included in the respective wage equations correcting
for selection bias at the specific quantiles. As the semiparametric models applied are computa-
tionally costly, a two-point wild-bootstrap test based on Horowitz and Ha¨rdle (1994) compares
the estimation outcome from the parametric and semiparametric binary choice models. The test
rejects the probit specification against the semiparametric models.
In line with the literature, differences of the GPG throughout the wage distribution are found.
The results suggest glass ceiling and less pronounced sticky floors. Gender wage inequality across
the wage distribution is measured by the change in the GPGs across the wage distribution. In
this paper, we focus on the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles. Thus, for the gender wage inequality
2Firpo et al. (2009b) despite RIF-OLS propose also RIF-Logit and a fully nonparametric estimator RIF-NP.
3Contrary to the approach by e.g. Machado and Mata (2005).
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measure, we estimate the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gaps.4 Despite measuring wage inequality
between men and women using the change of the GPG at different quantiles, estimation of the
variance or gini is also possible (see for example Fortin et al., 2011). The present work focuses on
the difference between quantile-specific wage gaps as the phenomena of glass ceiling and sticky
floors are particularly relevant when studying gender pay differences across the wage distribution.
Indeed, they have been heavily discussed in the literature (Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam,
2007; Xiu and Gunderson, 2014; Cardoso et al., 2016). The detailed decomposition reveals that
different categories of covariates such as educational attainment, labor market characteristics or
socio-demographic characteristics contribute in distinct ways to the gender gaps at as well as to
the change of the gaps between different quantiles. Similarly, the respective categories contribute
differently to the explained (endowments effect) or unexplained part (coefficients effect) of the
respective pay gaps. The results show that selection effects explain a substantial part of the
GPG that would otherwise remain unobserved or be attributed to discrimination. Moreover,
the contribution of the selection component to the GPG varies across the wage distribution.
The selection-corrected decomposition suggests that sample selection substantially contributes
to gender differences in pay along the earnings distribution.
The major contribution of this paper is the extension of the method proposed by Firpo et al.
(2009b) to control for sample selection bias and secondly the empirical application of the method
to Italy. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the estimation strategy is presented.
Section 3 outlines the model extension allowing for sample selection. Section 4 describes the
data set used in the analysis and provides the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation Strategy
The decomposition proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) is very popular when it comes
to analyzing mean wage differences by groups. In fact, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition has
become one of the work horses in applied economics (Fortin et al., 2011). Using assumptions
of linearity and zero-conditional mean, the approach allows to decompose pay gaps between
groups in detail. The method is relatively easy to implement and estimated via OLS. However,
the method allows only the estimation at the mean.5 In the literature, various extensions have
been proposed in order to be able to decompose the GPG beyond the mean (e.g Juhn et al., 1993;
Donald et al., 2000; Machado and Mata, 2005). The majority of the literature focuses on Con-
ditional Quantile Regressions models (e.g. Buchinsky, 1998; Machado and Mata, 2005). Several
of these approaches calculate the aggregate decomposition only and rely on various assumptions
as well as are computationally intense. The latter is in particular an issue of the detailed (and
not for the aggregate decomposition) beyond the mean. The method proposed by Machado
4For example, the 90-10 wage gap is the difference between the GPG at the 90th and the GPG at the 10th
percentile.
5The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition is outlined in detail in Appendix A.
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and Mata (2005) that is reconsidered or applied inter alia by Albrecht et al. (2003) and Melly
(2005b, 2005a) allows to conduct a detailed Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition beyond the
mean.6 The approach is based on CQRs and assigns to the decomposition the effect of each
single covariate for a distributional statistic (quantile, variance or gini) other than the mean.
However, the method is generally path dependent, i.e. the decomposition outcome depends on
the order in which the decomposition is performed (Fortin et al., 2011). In the underlying inves-
tigation, UQRs of RIFs are used to obtain a Oaxaca-Blinder type detailed decomposition beyond
the mean (Firpo et al., 2009b). In the RIF-OLS model applied here, similar to the assumptions
in the classical Oaxaca-Blinder method and the Machado-Mata approach, linearity is assumed.
The method based on RIF regressions is, as well as the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
path independent in the sense of Gelbach (2016). The main advantage of the UQR model over
the CQR model is that it allows for the unconditional mean interpretation. The latter is used
in Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions and is particularly interesting for policy evaluation as it esti-
mates the effect of regressors on the entire (unconditional) wage distribution (Borah and Basu,
2013). CQRs analyze effects over the conditional wage distribution and hence are applicable
only to subgroups of the target population.7 In cases of concerns of model misspecification
due to nonlinearity, the analysis can be repeated with a semiparametric reweighting scheme.8
The combination of the RIF-OLS decomposition with a semiparametric reweighting estimator
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) allows to solve the problem of potential misspecification of
the RIF-OLS model if linearity does not hold. The analysis shows only small differences when
using the Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition based on RIF-OLS without or with reweighting.
In particular, the specification and reweighting errors are small. In Section 4.3, we illustrate
that the decomposition outcome with and without reweighting are similar and that the the spec-
ification error due to potential nonlinearity is small. This implies that using the RIF-OLS yields
a good estimate of the UQPE.9 As the main focus of this paper is quantile-specific selection
correction and as the estimates do not change significantly in the linear or non-linear model, in
the following the estimation approach using RIF-OLS is outlined and then extended to allow for
sample selectivity. The paper extends the RIF-OLS model such that it corrects the wage model
for selection bias at the corresponding quantile. It is accounted for sample selectivity issues
using three distinct binary choice models; probit, Ichimura (1993) and Klein and Spady (1993).
Even though, the semiparametric Ichimura and Klein-Spady models are computationally costly,
the paper focuses on these models for sample correction as distributional assumptions may be
important in sample-selection processes (Martins, 2001; Fro¨lich, 2006). Indeed, a specification
6Albrecht et al. (2003) and Melly (2005b, 2005a) use the working paper version of Machado and Mata (2005).
7For illustration, we compare estimates of the gender wage penalty obtained from CQRs and UQRs in Sec-
tion 4.2.
8Indeed, if the assumption of linearity in the RIF-OLS does not hold, the model is misspecified. The estimation
procedure with reweighting is outlined in Appendix B. The results of the method without and with reweighting
are summarized in Section 4.3.
9Firpo et al. (2009b) find that RIF-OLS estimates compared to RIF-Logit and the completely nonlinear
RIF-NP estimates are very similar for the effect of union membership on log wages.
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test rejects the parametric selection model and the semiparametric approaches are found to
be, especially at lower quantiles, more informative.10 Using the proposed extension allows to
compute the selection-adjusted quantile-specific Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition of the GPG
showing explicitly the contribution of sample selectivity to the quantile-specific GPGs.
2.1 RIF Regressions at Quantiles
The RIF-OLS regression model allows to estimate the effect of explanatory variables, X, on
the unconditional quantile, Qτ , of an outcome variable, Y . The RIF is estimated in quantile
regressions by first calculating the sample quantile Qˆτ and computing the density at Qˆτ , that
is f(Qˆτ ) using kernel methods (Firpo et al., 2009b). Moreover, this approach relies on the
indicator function 1{Y ≤ Qτ} taking value one if the condition in {·} is true, zero otherwise.
Estimates for each observation i of the RIF, R̂IF (Yi;Qτ ), are then obtained by inserting Qˆτ
and f(Qˆτ ) in the aggregate RIF-function, defined as:
RIF (Y ;Qτ ) = Qτ + IF (Y ;Qτ )
= Qτ +
τ − 1{Y ≤ Qτ}
fY (Qτ )
=
1
fY (Qτ )
1{Y > Qτ}+Qτ − 1
fY (Qτ )
(1− τ) (1)
where the RIF is the first order approximation of the quantile Qτ . IF (Y ;Qτ ) represents the
influence function for the τth quantile. It measures the influence of an individual observation
on the τth quantile. Adding the quantile Qτ to the influence function yields the RIF. The
probability density of Y evaluated at Qτ is fY (Qτ ).
Firpo et al. (2009b) model the conditional expectation of the RIF-regression function,
E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )|X], as a function of explanatory variables, X, in the UQR:
E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )|X] = gQτ (X) (2)
where a linear function Xβτ is specified for gQτ (X), as for example in Borah and Basu (2013).
The average derivative of the UQR, EX
[dgQτ (X)
dX
]
, captures the marginal effect of a small lo-
cation shift in the distribution of covariates on the τth unconditional quantile of Y keeping
everything else constant. Therefore, the coefficients, βτ , can be unconditionally interpreted, as
E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )] = EX
[
E
(
RIF (Y ;Qτ )|X
)]
= E(X)βτ . That is the unconditional expectations
E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )] using the LIE allow for the unconditional mean interpretation. On the contrary,
only the conditional mean interpretation is valid in the context of CQRs; Qτ (Y |X) = XβCQRτ ,
where βCQRτ can be interpreted as the effect of X on the τth conditional quantile of Y given
X. The LIE does not apply here; Qτ 6= EX [Qτ (Y |X)] = E(X)βCQRτ , where Qτ is the uncondi-
tional quantile. Hence, βCQRτ cannot be interpreted as the effect of increasing the mean value
10The specification test is outlined in Section 4.4.1.
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of X in the unconditional quantile Qτ . This is one pitfall of CQRs in decomposition methods.
The unconditional mean interpretation is important for decompositions in the sense of Oaxaca
(1973) and Blinder (1973). Indeed, Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions use the unconditional mean
interpretation of βτ , i.e. the interpretation of βτ as the effect of increasing the mean value of
X on the mean value of Y . In UQR, the coefficients βτ can thus be estimated by OLS in the
following way:
Qτ = E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )] = EX [RIF (Y ;Qτ )|X] = E(X)βτ (3)
The basic wage equation of the RIF-OLS model at quantile τ , with τ ∈ (0, 1), is then:
RIF (Y ;Qτ ) = Xβτ + uτ (4)
where Y is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings and X is a vector of K explanatory variables
(including the constant), βτ is the corresponding coefficient vector and uτ is the corresponding
error term. The coefficient vector of the unconditional quantile at each observation i is defined
as:
βˆτ = (
N∑
i=1
X ′iXi)
−1
N∑
i=1
X ′iR̂IF (Yi;Qτ ) (5)
UQRs estimate the effect of covariates on all parts of the earnings distribution and are thus
particularly interesting for policy implications or evaluation. CQRs do not allow to draw conclu-
sions about the impact of a variable on the overall earnings distribution but rather provide in-
sights about the dispersion of earnings within different subgroups of the target population (Borah
and Basu, 2013).
2.2 Decomposition
Given the assumptions that the mean of the RIF-function is equal to the actual quantile as well
as to the mean of the conditional expectation given X shown in equation (3), we have:
E[RIF (YM ;Qτ )|XM ]− E[RIF (YF ;Qτ )|XF ] = X¯MβMτ − X¯FβFτ
= ∆τ
where ∆ˆτ is the GPG at the τth quantile and M = Male and F = Female.
The GPG is, as in the standard two-fold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, decomposed in an
endowments (explained) and a coefficients (unexplained) component. The decomposition has
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then the following form:
∆ˆτ = ∆ˆEτ + ∆ˆCτ
= (X¯M − X¯F )βˆF,τ + X¯M (βˆM,τ − βˆF,τ ) (6)
where the index E indicates the Endowments Effect and the index C the Coefficients Effect.
To perform a detailed decomposition, the contribution of each element of the vector of
explanatory variables X¯ on both components is estimated. For identification, a detailed de-
composition underlies thus stronger assumptions such as functional form restrictions as well
as potentially further restrictions on the distribution of the error term. An example is the
assumption of independence of the set of covariates and the dummy identifying group member-
ship (Fortin et al., 2011). In the RIF-OLS model, the detailed components can be estimated
in the same way as in the detailed Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean. However, as in
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean, the decomposition based on RIF-OLS changes
according to the choice of the reference category (Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988;
Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). We follow the standard case and use male coefficients as the
non-discriminatory wage structure. As in standard detailed Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at
the mean, the contribution of the single regressors to the components of the GPG are path
independent also in the RIF-OLS framework.
3 Accounting for Selection
The estimation strategy outlined in Section 2.1 yields inconsistent and biased estimates of the
wage equation and hence of the decomposition parts due to non-randomness of the sample
(Heckman, 1979; 1990; Buchinsky, 1998; Albrecht et al., 2009). Indeed, the observed individ-
uals with a positive labor income may be a non-random subsample of the individuals in the
population. As the origin of the selection could be related to earnings, it is essential to ex-
plicitly consider the selection process in the estimation of the wage equation. The selection
into wage work may depend on some positive factors such as individual ability, motivation or
educational quality, raising both, the probability of being employed and wages. However, it is
omitted in the earnings equation as these factors are unobservable in the data. The incidence
of receiving a wage offer may not only be non-random but also different for men and women.
Using the proposed extension of the quantile-specific wage model allows to obtain consistent
estimates as well as to attribute the selection effect to the endowments and coefficients part of
the quantile-specific GPGs. The estimation procedure consists, similar to Heckman (1979), of
two steps. In a first-step estimation, the semiparametric estimator of the selection parameter is
estimated. In a second-step regression, the selectivity-corrected model is estimated. The main
difference compared to Heckman (1979) is that here the estimated selection terms are estimated
with distribution-free approaches rather than by a parametric method (Newey, 2009). Moreover,
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instead of using only the traditional IMR, an approximation function is used.
The selection decision of interest is the employees’ work decision. The decision is identified
by the indicator variable E , which is equal to one if the individual is in employment and zero
otherwise. The reservation wage, Y res, is not observed but we observe, whether the difference
between the market wage, Y , and Y res is positive or not. Hence, E = 1 if Y − Y res > 0,
E = 0 otherwise. In a first-step estimation, the selection equation of the single-index model is
estimated with SLS and reads as:11
E = m(Zγ) + v (7)
where Z is a 1×T vector of regressors influencing the employment decision with t = 0, . . . , T . The
corresponding parameters are contained in the T ×1 column vector γ and v is the usual additive
error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with Z. The function m(·) is an unknown link
or smooth function. Contrary to parametric models, in semiparametric single-index models, not
only γ but also m(·) must be estimated.12 The set of covariates Z includes at least one variable
not included in X and uncorrelated with the log of hourly wages Y (the underlying dependent
variable) but influencing the work decision. This is important for identification of the selection
decision. Moreover, if the regressors in Z are not different from the variables in X, the selectivity-
corrected regression will be highly collinear. Semiparametric single-index models (such as the
Ichimura and Klein-Spady model) are quite popular in nonparametric estimation as they work
similar to parametric models (Henderson and Parmeter, 2015). However, no distributional
assumptions are required to set up these models, while in the probit model, the standard normal
distribution is assumed. Using the semiparametric single-index models that do not require
any distributional assumptions allows to circumvent potential bias of the selection-correction
terms due to non-normality of the selection process. Indeed, distributional assumptions may be
important when considering sample-selection processes (Martins, 2001).
The semiparametric single-index models used to estimate the selection equation are iterative
procedures and hence are computationally heavy given that nonparametric kernel estimation
is conducted at each iteration. For the estimation, the second-order Gaussian kernel is used
and the bandwidth is selected by likelihood cross-validation. The SLS estimator is consistent
and independent of the distribution of v (Buchinsky, 1998). The Klein-Spady model achieves
the semiparametric efficiency bound for binary choice models, while the Ichimura estimator is
inefficient if the model suffers from heteroskedasticity (Ichimura, 1993).13 Buchinsky (1998),
as well as Albrecht et al. (2009) and Chzhen and Mumford (2011) use power series estimation
11The parametric selection equation has the following form: E = Zγ + v.
12The general form of single-index models is: E = m
(
φ(Z, γ)
)
+ v, where m(·) is the unknown smooth
function and φ(·) is a known parametric function with T regressors, and coefficient vector γ having dimension
P × 1 (Ichimura, 1993; Henderson and Parmeter, 2015). As φ(Z, γ) is a scalar, it is necessarily single index.
Similar to many other studies, we assume a linear single-index, and thus the number of regressors and parameters
are equal, i.e. T = P .
13The probit estimate is efficient under normally distributed errors e.g. Buchinsky (1998).
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in order to estimate the correction term in the CQR model. We replace the power series by
polynomials of order j.14 The following polynomial of order j is estimated:
hˆτ (mˆ) = δˆτPS(mˆ) (8)
where PS(mˆ) is a polynomial vector in m:
PS(mˆ) =
[
PS1(mˆ), . . . , PSJ(mˆ)
]
and PSj(mˆ) = λ(ZAγˆ)
j with j = 1, 2, . . . , J . The correction term hˆτ (mˆ) is an approximation
of the unknown function for selection correction; hˆτ (mˆ)→ hτ (m) as the number of parameters
goes to infinity. The nonlinear function λ is the standard IMR15 and δˆ are the corresponding
coefficient estimates, which vary with the specific quantile τ . The index A denotes individuals
accepting a wage offer. The parameter estimates γˆ are estimated via semiparametric single-
index methods (Ichimura and Klein-Spady). The correction was shown to be asymptotically
normal (Newey, 2009). In this study second-order polynomials are used as polynomials allow for
more flexibility than standard parametric selection models (Carneiro et al., 2011; Cornelissen
et al., 2016). Even though, second-order polynomials rule out a nonmonotonic shape of hˆ(·),
we focus on polynomials of order two as higher order polynomials may become instable at the
boundaries of the data space (Harrell, 2015).
Estimation of semiparametric selection models in the way described above does not allow for
identification of the level of the constant and the first reported continuous variable (Buchinsky,
1998).16 Therefore, we normalize the respective coefficients from the semiparametric single-
index estimations to the corresponding parameter estimates obtained from the probit model.17
This way of normalizing the coefficients allows also for a better comparison of the Ichimura
and Klein-Spady estimation outcome with the probit estimation outcome (Albrecht et al., 2009;
Chzhen and Mumford, 2011). We estimate then the following expression:
hˆ∗τ (mˆ
∗) = PS(mˆ∗) (9)
where PSj(mˆ
∗) = δˆ∗τλ∗(Z∗Aγ
∗)j with Z∗A = (1, ZA,1, ZA,T−2) and γˆ
∗ = (γˆ∗0 , γˆ∗1 , γˆT−2)T having
dimension 1 × (1 + 1 + T − 2) include the normalized constant γˆ∗0 as well as the normalized
coefficient estimate of the first continuous variable γˆ∗1 from the selection decision. The coefficient
vector γˆT−2 includes all the remaining parameter estimates from the single-index models. The
vector Z∗Aγˆ
∗ has then dimension 1 × 1. The (nonlinear) function or the IMR, λ∗(Z∗Aγˆ∗), is
estimated and depends on the normalized constant, the normalized coefficient estimate of the
14Using orthogonal polynomials allows to rule out multicollinearity issues (see Newey, 2009, for further details).
15with λ = φ(·)
Φ(·) being the usual IMR; φ(·) is the probability density function, Φ(·) the cumulative distribution
function.
16The semiparametric estimators require scale and local normalization (Buchinsky, 1998; Newey, 2009).
17For an overview of normalization in single-index models see for example Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
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first continuous variable in Z as as well as on the other variables in Z and has dimension 1× 1,
δˆ∗contains the corresponding coefficient estimates.
In the second-step estimation, the function for selection correction hˆ∗τ (·) is included in the
basic wage equation, i.e. equation (4), correcting for selection at the τth quantile. Thereby,
hˆ∗τ (·) acts as the IMR does in the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure but is quantile-specific
and does not require any distributional assumptions of the error terms of the selection process.
The wage equation corrected for selectivity bias at the τth quantile with j = 2 looks as follows:
R̂IF (Y ;Qτ ) = Xβˆτ + hˆ
∗
τ (mˆ
∗) + ˆτ
= Xβˆτ + δˆ
∗
τPS(mˆ
∗) + ˆτ
= Xβˆτ + δˆ
∗
1τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1 + δˆ∗2τλ
∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2 + ˆτ (10)
where Y is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings and X is a vector of K explanatory variables,
the selection correction term λ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)j is a function evaluated at Z∗Aγˆ
∗. The corresponding coef-
ficient vectors are βˆτ and δˆ
∗
jτ with j = 1, 2. For equation (10) to hold, the following assumptions
are made. The reservation and the market wage depend on unobservables, the joint distribu-
tion of u and v is continuous and the probability of observing a positive difference (Y − Y res)
given Z, depends only on Zγ.18 The selectivity-corrected coefficient estimates are consistent
and asymptotically normal distributed. This holds under the assumption that the second-stage
estimation successfully corrects for the selection bias (see Appendix C for further details). The
consistent coefficient estimates are then obtained from RIF-OLS regression of R̂IF (Y ;Qτ ) on
X, λ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)1 and λ∗(Z∗Aγˆ
∗)2.
The parametric selection correction is conducted as in the standard OLS model adjusted
for sample selectivity, i.e. the IMR is added as a regressor to the earnings equation (Heckman,
1979). The RIF-OLS model with parametric selection correction is presented in Appendix D.
4 Empirical Application
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on the survey Plus19 from the Italian Isfol. The survey is
particularly relevant for the study of wage inequality by gender as it delivers broad information
on the personal working profiles and individual motivation of the interviewees.
The underlying study uses the complete release of panel dimension.20 The estimation is
based on a pooled regression model including wave or year dummies as explanatory variables.
Individuals enter as well as leave the sample (through attrition). Hence, the composition of
the sample changes. The analysis is restricted to the private sector only as there has been a
18Similar to the assumptions made by Buchinsky (1998) for sample correction in CQRs.
19PLUS = Participation, Labor, Unemployment Survey
20Up to now, ISFOL PLUS has released the following data waves; 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014.
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general ‘wage freeze’ in the Italian public sector at the beginning of the 21st century (Bordogna,
2012; Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015). This policy disproportionately affected women as
women are more likely to work in the public sector. Consequently, the policy influenced the
GPG. The analysis focuses on employees working at least 15 and maximally 45 hours per week.
Self-employed, students, pensioners as well as other inactive and involuntarily unemployed indi-
viduals are excluded from the analysis. The selection decision of interest is thus the employment
or work decision from search or voluntary unemployment. We consider only labor income from
the main job (defined as the job that pays the highest wage). After deleting observations with
missing values on other variables of interest, we are left with a sample size of 24,267 individual
wage observations in the private sector21, of which 11,390 are female and 12,877 are male. This
study uses the log of hourly wage as dependent variable. It is defined as the net monthly wage
perceived divided by the number of actual working hours. An alternative are monthly gross
earnings, which, however, are almost entirely missing (98% of all observations are missing).
As a second alternative, gross annual earnings could be used. However, dividing gross annual
earnings by the number of months in a calendar year (plus an additional 13th month), gives
a difference amounting on average to more than 800 Euros per month between the artificially
created monthly gross income and the reported monthly gross income. Therefore, we prefer to
use the monthly-based net income as dependent variable. Individuals with children are granted
tax credits in Italy.22 As the tax credit is granted yearly, it does not impact on the monthly
perceived net income and hence having children does not directly affect monthly perceived net
wages in Italy. The explanatory variables used in the regression analysis are grouped in the
following categories: Education, Experience, Job Characteristics, Occupations and Industries,
Socio-Demographic Background and Selection. The set of regressors labeled Education contains
variables controlling for the level of educational attainment as well as for excellence in educa-
tion. The category Experience includes labor market experience and labor market experience
squared as well as job tenure. Job Characteristics include job-specific variables such as wage
compensatings (the level of satisfaction with the working climate, with work place stability,
with the working time as well as with the tasks at the current job). These job characteristics
influence the level of (net hourly) wages as employers offering lower wages, may compensate
their employees with more satisfactory job characteristics (Filer, 1985). Additionally, dummies
controlling for the kind of contract (part-time and unlimited) are included. The set of explana-
tory variables Occupations and Industries contains sectoral and occupational dummies, while
the category Socio-Demographic Background contains geographic controls as well as a dummy
accounting for whether the individual holds the Italian citizenship. The category controls also
for the family status (married or not) and the educational background of the parents (whether
2117,798 observations of the public sector have been dropped. The sample initially consists of 159,615 obser-
vations in total.
22In order to be eligible to the grant, annual gross earnings need to be below 95,000 Euro (see Worldwide-Tax-
Summaries, 2017, for further information).
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they have graduated from university). This category controls for any potential labor-market
favoritism or discrimination coming from informal social networks. Indeed, informal networks
may be important in Italy and may directly influence the wage level (Pistaferri, 1999).23 Time-
varying characteristics are caught by wave dummies and are included in this category.24 The
category Selection contains the selection correction terms. A complete list of variables used in
the study along with their categories and definitions can be found in Appendix E, Table E.1.
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for some of the variables included in the
analysis. Women have on average higher educational attainment than men, while men have more
years of labor market experience (Exper) and work on average longer for the same firm (Tenure)
than women. The underlying sample shows no huge differences in the level of satisfaction with
particular job characteristics between men and women. However, differences in the type of
contract are found. Women have much more often than men a part-time contract, while male
employees have more often an unlimited contract than female employees. There are no significant
differences in geographic indicators between women and men (North and Centre). Most of the
individuals observed are Italian citizens (Italian). Men and women are relatively equal in terms
of marriage (Married) as well as in having children at all (Kids). Yet, female employees have
more often children with less than ten years (Kids 10 ) compared to male employees. Female
workers engaged in the labor market are about four years younger than male employees (Age).
The variables Age, Kids and Kids 10 are included in the selection equation only.
23Individuals with access to these networks are more likely to obtain more attractive and thus generally better-
paying jobs.
24If not stated differently, the category Occupations and Industries contains sectoral dummies and the category
Socio-Demographic Background contains year or wave dummies.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Education
Elementary School 0.015 0.120 0.016 0.127
High School 0.584 0.493 0.590 0.492
University Degree 0.251 0.433 0.165 0.371
Max D Mark 0.039 0.194 0.020 0.139
Experience
Exper 13.942 11.307 17.813 13.396
Tenure 8.380 8.861 11.992 11.636
Job Characteristics
Work Climate 3.079 0.852 3.055 0.825
Work Stab 2.937 0.982 2.985 0.949
Work Time 3.022 0.849 3.021 0.806
Work Task 3.043 0.777 3.009 0.771
Part 0.251 0.434 0.054 0.227
Contract Type 0.761 0.426 0.818 0.386
Occupations and Industries
Manager 0.111 0.314 0.111 0.314
Intermed Prof 0.555 0.497 0.405 0.491
Socio-Demographic Background
North 0.554 0.497 0.522 0.500
Centre 0.211 0.408 0.198 0.398
Italian 0.988 0.110 0.995 0.074
Married 0.480 0.500 0.446 0.497
Age 34.920 10.508 37.866 12.901
Kids 0.481 0.500 0.461 0.498
Kids 10 0.300 0.458 0.230 0.421
Observations 11,390 12,877
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4.2 The Effect of Women on Earnings and Raw GPGs
It is a well-known result in the literature that women perceive lower wages than men – other
things equal e.g. Blau and Kahn (1992, 2003); England (2006); Grove et al. (2011). Table 2
shows the unadjusted GPG at the mean and at different quantiles (Panel A) as well as the
90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gap (Panel B). The raw mean GPG in log hourly wages in the
underlying sample amounts to 11.8 percentage points. Arulampalam et al. (2007) find for the
Italian private sector in the period 1995-2001 a mean wage gap between men and women equal
to 15.3 percentage points. They find a GPG amounting to 14.5 percentage points at the 10th
percentile, to 13.0 percentage points at the 50th percentile and to 19.4 percentage points at the
90th percentile.25 In the underlying sample quantile-specific GPGs are equal to 11.7, 10.0 and
17.9 percentage points at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, respectively. Glass ceiling and sticky
floors are assumed to exist in an economy, when the 90th and 10th percentile GPG, respectively,
exceeds the reference percentile wage gap by at least two percentage points (e.g. Arulampalam
et al., 2007). Indeed, Table 2 shows that class ceiling is found in the underlying study for the
Italian private sector; the 90th percentile wage gap exceeds the 10th percentile GPG by 6.2
percentage points and the 90th percentile wage gap exceeds the median pay gap by almost 8
percentage points. The 10th percentile pay gap lies slightly above the 50th pay gap (the 50-10
wage gap is slightly negative). As the 50-10 wage gap is slightly lower than 2 percentage points
(in absolute terms), only weak evidence for sticky floors is found. This result is in line with the
finding of Arulampalam et al. (2007) finding a 50-10 wage gap of -1.9 percentage points for the
Italian private sector. Hence, the pay gap between men and women varies significantly between
the top and bottom or median and the bottom and median of the wage distribution. Yet,
in the latter case, the difference is less pronounced. This finding underlines the importance of
considering the GPG at different quantiles and not only at the mean. Indeed, policy implications
may change according to whether the gap at different quantiles or at the mean is considered. In
particular, not only the magnitude of the raw GPG but also the decomposition may vary across
the wage distribution. Similarly, selection effects may change across the distribution. Even when
assuming that men and women have the same set of observable labor market characteristics, i.e.
considering the unexplained component26, there is a substantial (adjusted) GPG at the mean
as well as along the wage distribution due to differences in returns to observable labor market
characteristics (see Table 2, Panel A).27 This implies that the Italian private sector suffers from
a wage gap that is mainly due to the unexplained component, also referred to as discrimination.
Even though the coefficients component, i.e. the portion of the GPG not due to gender differences
in observed characteristics, is generally taken to be an estimate of gender discrimination, the
25Eurostat finds for the period considered in this study (2005-2014) an average raw GPG in hourly wages equal
to 5.6% for Italy as a whole, i.e. for the public and private sector (Eurostat, 2017).
26Following the standard set-up of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the female set of labor market charac-
teristic, X¯F , is used.
27The full estimation outcome from the standard decomposition at the mean is shown in Table A.1, while the
regression output from the RIF-OLS decomposition is presented in Table 4.
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unexplained portion of the GPG may include effects of unobserved productivity, innate ability
or other unobserved characteristics (Blau and Kahn, 2006). Hence, the unexplained component
or adjusted GPG may change, when it is accounted for sample selection.
Table 2: GPG at Different Quantiles and across the Wage Distribution
(a) Panel A: GPG at the Mean and at Different Quantiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(Unadjusted Gap) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Adjusted GPG 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.160***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: The unadjusted GPG is equal in magnitude to the raw GPG. The adjusted GPG is the unexplained
or coefficients part of the decomposition. The wage gaps have been estimated using the decomposition model
outlined in Section 2.2.
(b) Panel B: GPG across the Wage Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: The unadjusted change is the change in the unadjusted GPG from the top to the bottom and median,
column (1) and (2), as well as from the median to the bottom quantile, column (3).
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Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for the dummy variable female of a Mincer-type wage
model for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile using standard OLS, RIF-OLS and CQR.28 The
effect of being a women is, as expected, strictly negative all along the wage distribution as well
as at the mean. According to the OLS estimate, for female employees earnings are reduced by
approximately 11.5 percentage points. The UQR and CQR show as well that being a women
decreases earnings in the corresponding quantile of the conditional or unconditional earnings
distribution. The unconditional (negative) effect of women on log hourly earnings decreases
in absolute terms from the bottom to the median and increases thereinafter sharply. The
conditional effect decreases slightly from the 10th to the 50th percentile and increases thereafter.
Figure 1 plots the effect of being female on log hourly wages for both quantile methods.29 The
partial effect from the UQR is highly nonmonotonic, while the partial effect from the CQR shows
almost a linear pattern from the 20th percentile onwards. Both, Table 3 and Figure 1 show that
the magnitude of the estimation results changes depending on which approach (UQR or CQR)
is used.
Table 3: OLS, UQR and CQR of Log Hourly Wages – Gender Wage Penalty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
OLS UQR CQR UQR CQR UQR CQR
female -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.112*** -0.181*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications, for UQR and CQR
In the following, the detailed decomposition results at specific quantiles as well as across
the wage distribution using the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gaps as inequality measures are
presented. Then, the estimation results from the parametric and semiparametric binary choice
models are outlined and the set-up of the test for equality of the parametric and semiparametric
models as well as the results from the test are discussed. Finally, the decomposition outcome
with selection adjustment is shown.
28The full regression output of the Mincer-type wage model using OLS, UQR and CQR, respectively, is shown
in Appendix F, Table F.1. For all three model specifications, the same set of regressors is used.
29The CQ and UQ partial effects are evaluated at the 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,. . .,0.90, 0.95 quantile, respectively.
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Figure 1: UQR and CQR Estimates of the Effect of Women on Log Hourly Wages
4.3 RIF-OLS Decomposition along the Wage Distribution without Selection
Adjustment
Table 4 shows the decomposition outcome at specific quantiles. Women are found to have higher
observable educational characteristics than men. The difference between men and women is high-
est at the top of the wage distribution. On the contrary, male employees have higher experience
and job tenure. Again, the difference is highest at the 90th percentile. Differences in job char-
acteristics as well as in occupations and industries are insignificant at the bottom but negative
at the median and top of the wage distribution. The endowments effect of socio-demographic
background characteristics reduces the GPG slightly all along the wage distribution. Hence,
employed women generally are more often located in the North or Centre of Italy, come from
families with higher educational background and are more often married compared to men. The
total explained part is positive for low-income earners but negative for median- and top-income
earners. However, differences in observable labor market characteristics between men and women
statistically significantly reduce only the 90th percentile GPG. In terms of the coefficients effect,
educational differences between men and women are insignificant at the bottom, negative at
the median and positive at the top of the wage distribution. Gender differences in coefficients
to experience and job tenure are positive throughout the wage distribution. Different remuner-
ation to job characteristics between men and women significantly raises the GPG only at the
90th percentile. Gender-specific distributional differences in specific occupations or industries
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have a statistically significant impact on the coefficients effect all along the wage distribution.
Occupational and industrial gender differences in coefficients are negative at the bottom but
positive at the median and top of the wage distribution. An intuition of the negative coefficient
effect due to distributional differences in occupations and industries between men and women
at the 10th percentile GPG is that women are relatively more likely to self-select themselves in
low-income jobs and hence to receive the adequate formal education for these jobs e.g. Brekke
and Nyborg (2010). On the contrary, men working in the corresponding sector or occupation at
the bottom of the wage distribution have higher probability of not having the adequate formal
training compared to their female colleagues. The consequences are negative coefficient effects
due to distributional differences in occupations and industries. Negative coefficient estimates
due to gender differences in occupations and industries at the bottom of the wage distribu-
tion are also found by other studies (e.g. Xiu and Gunderson, 2014). The coefficients effect
of socio-demographic background characteristics is generally insignificant all along the income
distribution. Consequently, no evidence for gender-based discrimination or favoritism in the
labor market based on informal networks is found in this study. The total unexplained part
is statistically significant and positive throughout the distribution. In particular, it is a main
driver of the GPG at all quantiles considered, while the total explained part is rather small or
even working towards a closure of the gap. The coefficient component includes the constant
term.30
Table 5 shows the detailed decomposition results of the different wage inequality measures
(90-10, 90-50 and 50-10, respectively). By looking at the different components of the inequality
measures in terms of the endowments effect, gender differences in educational attainment is
found to reduce wage inequality between the top and bottom or median of the wage distribution.
Statistically significant and positive endowments effects of experience and tenure are found for
the top-bottom and top-median wage gaps. Hence, in terms of the explained component gender
differences in labor market experience and job tenure increase the 90-10 and 90-50 wage gaps,
respectively. Job characteristics as well as occupational and sectoral differences reduce the
difference in the GPG across the wage distribution. Differences by gender in socio-demographic
characteristics have a relevant but small impact on glass ceiling. All in all, differences in the
explained component decrease the difference between the GPGs at the top and bottom or median
of the wage distribution. In line with the relatively small 50-10 wage gap, gender differences
between the median and bottom of the earnings distribution are found to be rather negligible.
By looking at the unexplained component, positive coefficients of education are found to be
a main driver of the gender pay disparity between high- and low- or median-income earners.
Positive gender differences in returns to experience are found between the 90-10 and 90-50 wage
gaps. Similarly, gender differences in job characteristics contribute statistically significantly to
the difference between the GPG at the 90th and 10th or 50th percentile. Gender differences in
30At the bottom and median there is a premia for simply being male. Contrary, on the top there is a premia
for being female.
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coefficients due to job- and industry-sorting are another driver of gender wage inequality in the
Italian private sector. On the contrary, the coefficients effect due to changes in differences in
socio-demographic characteristics between men and women are found to have no statistically
significant impact on the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 pay gaps. The total unexplained component
is an important driver between the pay gaps at the top and bottom or median of the wage
distribution.31
In Appendix B, the reweighted decomposition approach is outlined and the decomposition
outcome with reweighting for both the quantile-specific GPG and the gender wage inequality
measures is shown (Tables B.1–B.2). The total reweighting error, (X¯M − X¯M )βˆrewτ , corresponds
to the difference between the Total Explained across the UQ Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
and the reweighted-regression decomposition. The reweighting error reflects the fact that the
endowments effect in the decomposition with reweighting is not exactly equal to the standard
endowments effect, i.e. without reweighting. This occurs, when the reweighted X¯rew is not
exactly equal to X¯. Figure 2 shows the reweghting error and Figure 3 the specification error
graphically along the wage distribution. The (total) specification error is the difference between
the Total Unexplained component from the model without and with reweighting; X¯rewM (βˆM,τ −
βˆrewM,τ ). The specification error is zero if the base model is truly linear. Both errors are rather
small, therefore, we expect the RIF-OLS model without reweighting not to be misspecified.
31As stated before, the wage structure component contains the constant term. Differences in the constant term
decrease wage inequality from the top to the bottom.
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Table 4: RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.066***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Job Characteristics 0.005 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.000 -0.001 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Total Explained 0.009 -0.001 -0.031***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.040 -0.027*** 0.102***
(0.026) (0.010) (0.023)
Experience 0.012 0.025** 0.123***
(0.026) (0.010) (0.024)
Job Characteristics -0.009 0.009 0.114**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.288*** 0.052** 0.223***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.012 -0.030 -0.059
(0.111) (0.043) (0.110)
Total Unexplained 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.210***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 5: Gender Wage Inequality – RIF-OLS Decomposition
Results
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Detailed Endowments Effect
Education -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience 0.041** 0.039*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Job Characteristics -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.009*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Occupations and Industries -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.004** -0.004* -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total Explained -0.040*** -0.030*** -0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Detailed Coefficients Effect
Education 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.014
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
Experience 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.013
(0.027) (0.023) (0.020)
Job Characteristics 0.123** 0.106** 0.017
(0.056) (0.048) (0.041)
Occupations and Industries 0.511*** 0.172*** 0.340***
(0.071) (0.061) (0.052)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.047 -0.029 -0.018
(0.127) (0.109) (0.092)
Total Unexplained 0.102*** 0.110*** -0.008
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Figure 2: Endowments Effect with and without Reweigthing
Figure 3: Coefficients Effect with and without Reweighting
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4.4 Estimation of the Incidence of Employment
Table 6 shows the estimation outcome from the single-index models (probit, Ichimura and Klein-
Spady, respectively). The set of regressors in the selection equations, Z, contains at least one
variable not included in X.32 The following variables are included in the selection equation only:
Age, Age5064, Partner Works as well as Kids and Kids 10. These regressors are excluded from
the wage equation as they should not influence the wage level directly but reservation earnings.
The controls for having children, Kids, or young children, Kids 10, are used to identify the em-
ployment decision.33 The variables are assumed to affect individual propensity to be employed
but not the level of (log) hourly wages. The logic behind is that women with children and in par-
ticular young children are less likely to accept wage offers due to child-rearing. In the empirical
literature, most studies on the relationship between fertility and female labor market participa-
tion find a negative correlation among child-care and female labor force participation (Martins,
2001; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Lee, 2009; Chang, 2011). Contrary to mothers, fathers
have higher employment probability. This is due to the persistence of the male-breadwinner
and mother-caretaker model in particular in Southern European countries like Italy (Mı´nguez,
2004). The dummy variable Age5064 is equal to one if the individual’s age is between 50 and 64
years and zero otherwise. Thus, Age5064 is a proxy for the last career stage. After child-care
and -rearing, the employment probability may increase especially for women. The variable Part-
ner Works is equal to one if the spouse or the partner of the individual is employed and zero
otherwise. Devereux (2004) and Bar et al. (2015) find a strong relationship between spousal
income and individual labor market participation or employment decision. Therefore, omitting
a control for the spouse’s or partner’s labor market status from the selection equation would
potentially lead to inconsistent estimates of the wage equation.
The results in Table 6 suggest, on the one hand, that with increasing age, women are more
likely to be employed. This may be driven by career breaks due to child-care at earlier career
stages. On the other hand, men’s incidence of employment decreases slightly with increasing age.
Yet, at the final stage of their career both men and women are more likely to accept wage offers.
Higher education raises the probability to work for both men and women. Individuals living
and working in the North or Centre of Italy have higher probability to be in employment. The
positive impact on the probability is highest for employees in Northern Italy. Married women are
less likely to be in employment, while married men are more likely to be employed.34 Holding
the Italian citizenship, if significant, has a positive effect on the incidence of employment for
female as well as for male employees. Owning a house significantly raises employees’ incidence
32The set of regressors Z for the employment decision is the same in each binary choice estimation, i.e. in the
probit, Ichimura and Klein-Spady model, respectively.
33For example Chzhen and Mumford (2011) assume that the age of children in the household does not affect
the wage level and use it (inter alia) to identify selection of women in full-time employment in Great Britain.
34In the semiparametric models, no significant effect of being married on the employment probability for men
is found.
24
of employment.35 The control for owning a house includes bank-financed houses. Consequently,
individuals paying-off mortgages are more likely to accept a wage offer. For other house owners,
the variable Homeowner, as a proxy for wealth, controls for wealthier individuals having better
networks and hence are more likely to receive job offers. This increases in turn their likelihood
to accept a job offer. Having a partner or a spouse in employment significantly increases the
employment probability for men in all three models. For women, the effect is negative in
the semiparametric models and positive in the probit estimation. Having children reduces as
expected the employment probability of women, while it raises the employment probability for
men. Having young children is statistically significant and negative for women, while it impacts
positively but statistically insignificantly on the probability of accepting a wage offer for men.36
The coefficient estimates from the semiparametric single-index models, are comparable to each
other in terms of magnitude. The coefficient estimates of the probit model are relatively higher
compared to the semiparametric binary choice models in absolute terms. Yet, the signs of the
coefficient estimates point generally in the same directions in all three models. The difference
in magnitude in the point estimates in the probit estimation compared to the outcome from the
semiparametric specifications is in line with results obtained by Buchinsky (1998) or Albrecht
et al. (2009) and Chzhen and Mumford (2011).
In order to check whether running the computationally cumbersome semiparametric methods
is worth it, in Section 4.4.1, the estimation outcome from the semiparametric selection models
is compared with the regression outcome from the parametric selection model using a two-point
wild-bootstrap test based on the idea in Horowitz and Ha¨rdle (1994).
35Except for women in the Klein-Spady model, where owning a house has a negative effect on females’ em-
ployment probability.
36In the semiparametric binary choice models, the effect of having young children on the employment proba-
bility for men is statistically significant and negative. Yet, the total effect of having children (Kids and Kids 10 )
is positive.
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Table 6: Estimation Outcome Incidence of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women Men
Probit Ichimura Klein-Spady Probit Ichimura Klein-Spady
Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment
Constant -1.335*** -1.335 -1.335 -1.002*** -1.002 -1.002
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Age 0.003** 0.003 0.003 -0.006*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age5064 0.598*** 0.334*** 0.320*** 0.259*** 0.035** 0.025***
(0.038) (0.010) (0.015) (0.043) (0.017) (0.003)
Elementary School -0.070 0.023*** -0.024 -0.354*** -0.021 -0.018***
(0.059) (0.009) (0.023) (0.063) (0.026) (0.006)
High School 0.410*** 0.153*** 0.141*** 0.189*** 0.007 0.001
(0.023) (0.002) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.002)
University Degree 0.410*** 0.166*** 0.208*** 0.088*** -0.003 -0.014***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.010) (0.031) (0.006) (0.003)
North 0.961*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.888*** 0.022*** 0.011***
(0.019) (0.002) (0.007) (0.020) (0.005) (0.002)
Centre 0.641*** 0.151*** 0.100*** 0.584*** 0.001 0.003
(0.021) (0.003) (0.008) (0.023) (0.006) (0.003)
Married -0.036 -0.132*** -0.134*** 0.489*** -0.004 -0.001
(0.033) (0.004) (0.010) (0.038) (0.007) (0.004)
Italian 0.338*** -0.006 0.107*** 0.406*** 0.001 0.001
(0.070) (0.007) (0.011) (0.106) (0.037) (0.004)
Homeowner 0.046** 0.010*** -0.031*** 0.213*** 0.022*** 0.007**
(0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.003)
Partner Works 0.051* -0.010*** -0.031*** 0.167*** 0.012* 0.010***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.009) (0.030) (0.006) (0.003)
Kids -0.220*** -0.164*** -0.096*** 0.162*** 0.049*** 0.018***
(0.029) (0.005) (0.010) (0.029) (0.007) (0.004)
Kids 10 -0.081*** -0.003 -0.037*** -0.012 -0.027*** -0.016***
(0.027) (0.004) (0.010) (0.039) (0.006) (0.004)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,283 30,283 30,283 22,406 22,406 22,406
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: The constant and the Age coefficients in the semiparametric binary choice models have been normalized
to the corresponding values from the parametric probit model.
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4.4.1 Testing for Equality of the Parametric and Semiparametric Binary Choice
Model
The results obtained from the different selection models are compared using a modified version
of the Horowitz and Ha¨rdle (1994) test proposed in Henderson and Parmeter (2015). The test
compares the parametric with the semiparametric choice model of the employment decision E
on Zγ. The null hypothesis tests whether the parametric model is the correct specification. In
the underlying case, the parametric form is the probit model and hence H0 = E(Y |X) = F (Zγ),
where F (·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The alternative hypothesis
is H1 = E(Y |X) = H(Zγ), where H(·) is the unknown smooth function. The feasible test
statistics looks as follows:
THH = {E − F (Zγˆ)}{H(Zγˆ)− F (Zγˆ)} (11)
The intuition behind the test is the following: given that H(·) = F (·) holds, the parametric
model is specified correctly and, therefore, should not differ from the semiparametric estimate
of the function. In this case, cumbersome computation of the semiparametric models is not
necessary. Horowitz and Ha¨rdle (1994) pre-multiply the right-hand side of equation (11) by a
non-negative weighting function that punishes extreme observations. Yet, the test is sensitive to
the choice of the weighting function (Proenca, 1993). In the underlying analysis bootstrapping
is used what makes the weighting unnecessary (Proenca, 1993; Henderson and Parmeter, 2015).
A two-point wild bootstrap in order to calculate the upper-tail bootstrap p-value is used. The
p-values in Table 7 reject the parametric model at a 10% significance level in all cases. In
comparison with the Ichimura estimation, the probit model is even rejected at a 1% significance
level for both men and women.
Table 7: Results of the Horowitz-Ha¨rdle Test
(1) (2)
p-Value
Female Sample Male Sample
Probit – Ichimura 0.002 0.002
Probit – Klein and Spady 0.067 0.006
Following Martins (2001), Figure 4 represents the parametric and semiparametric fit for men
and women, Figure 5 shows the respective fits for the full sample. The Figures show that the
probit specification does not capture the behavior of individuals with low index numbers very
well. This is particularly pronounced for women. Hence, the semiparametric models provide
more information on the selection behavior of the individuals in the sample.
27
Figure 4: Probit and Semiparametric Fit for the Estimated Index by Gender
Figure 5: Probit and Semiparametric Fit for the Estimated Index
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4.5 RIF-OLS Decomposition along the Wage Distribution with Selection Ad-
justment
In this Section, we estimate the selectivity-corrected wage model using second-order polyno-
mials.37 Tables 8–9 show the detailed decomposition outcome at specific quantiles when it is
accounted for sample selectivity. Table 10 summarizes the main result; the unexplained compo-
nent of the GPG being the main driver of the pay disparity at the mean as well as along the wage
distribution changes in the case of sample-selection adjustment. The part generally attributed to
discrimination is reduced at the bottom but increased at the top of the wage distribution. This
implies that without selection correction, we overestimate the part attributed to gender-wage
discrimination for low-income earners and underestimate it for high-income earners.
In fact, gender differences in unobservables are main drivers of the GPG at the 10th and 50th
percentile. Not accounting for sample selection would therefore significantly underestimate the
total explained part at the 10th and 50th percentile. In terms of the coefficients effect, the results
suggest that women are paid more from the same set of generally unobservable characteristics at
the median and top of the wage distribution. At the bottom, the sign of the selection component
in terms of the coefficients effect works in the opposite direction: men gain more than women
from the same set of unobservable characteristics. Without selection adjustment, the unex-
plained component is underestimated at the top but overestimated at the median and bottom.
All in all, the selection component is one of the most important components explaining gender
differences in pay along the earnings distribution. Hence, otherwise unobservable characteristics
and individual heterogeneity contribute significantly to the quantile-specific GPGs. However,
the effect differs both in sign and magnitude at the distinct points of the wage distribution.
Table 11 shows that the selection component also significantly contributes to the variation
of the GPG across the earnings distribution. Between the top and bottom, differences in the
selection correction term increase wage inequality. On the contrary, gender differences in unob-
servable characteristics reduce wage inequality between the top and median and the median and
the bottom of the wage distribution. Different coefficients of unobservables between men and
women decreases wage inequality all along the wage distribution. This result is driven by higher
prices for women given the same set of unobservable characteristics between men and women at
the top of the wage distribution.
In Appendix D, the contribution of the selection component to the GPG at different quantiles
as well as across the wage distribution is presented for the model with parametric selection
correction.
37The polynomials are not orthogonal. However, the selection terms used are not collinear; Corr(λ, λ2) < |0.5|.
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Table 8: RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Ichimura
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.068***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.000 -0.026***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Selection 0.050*** 0.013*** -0.013
(0.011) (0.004) (0.013)
Total Explained 0.055*** 0.012** -0.042***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.015)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.047* -0.032*** 0.080***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.024)
Experience -0.010 0.024** 0.142***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.026)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.008 0.118**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.290*** 0.052** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.031 -0.038 -0.060
(0.112) (0.043) (0.110)
Selection 0.599 -0.114 -0.971**
(0.423) (0.165) (0.429)
Total Unexplained 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.221***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.017)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 9: RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Klein-Spady
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.065***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.000 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Selection 0.079*** 0.019** -0.006
(0.023) (0.010) (0.027)
Total Explained 0.084*** 0.018* -0.037
(0.023) (0.010) (0.026)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.054* -0.033*** 0.079***
(0.028) (0.010) (0.024)
Experience -0.006 0.022** 0.130***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.026)
Job Characteristics -0.010 0.009 0.118**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.289*** 0.052** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.045 -0.042 -0.071
(0.112) (0.043) (0.110)
Selection 0.275 -0.040 -0.512
(0.419) (0.162) (0.415)
Total Unexplained 0.033 0.082*** 0.216***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.028)
24,267 24,267 24,267
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 10: GPG and Total Unexplained Component with and without Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(Unadjusted) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Total Unexplained 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.210***
(No Selection) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Total Unexplained 0.123***
(Selection – Standard Heckman Two-Stage) (0.006)
Total Unexplained 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.211***
(Selection – Probit) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Total Unexplained 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.221***
(Selection – Ichimura) (0.016) (0.006) (0.017)
Total Unexplained 0.033 0.082*** 0.216***
(Selection – Klein-Spady) (0.025) (0.010) (0.028)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: For the mean, the difference in the Total Unexplained component with no selection and with
selection adjustment is statistically significant at a 5% significance level. In the case of the standard
probit model, the difference is not statistically significant at all quantiles. For the semiparametric
selection models, the difference is statistically significant at a 5% significance level only for the 10th
percentile. At the 50th percentile, the difference is statistically significant at a 10% significance level
for the component with no selection and the Klein-Spady selection-adjusted component. At the 90th
percentile, the difference is not statistically different from zero in both cases. The difference between
the respective components has been tested using a two-sample t-test.
Table 11: Gender Wage Inequality – Selection Component
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Ichimura Klein-Spady Ichimura Klein-Spady Ichimura Klein-Spady
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Selection 0.072*** 0.034*** -0.026* -0.037*** -0.025 -0.060**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.025)
Coefficients Effect
Selection -0.311*** -0.138* -0.857* -0.314 -0.472 -0.012
(0.103) (0.112) (0.460) (0.454) (0.445) (0.449)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the GPG at different points of as well as gender wage inequality across the
wage distribution. The empirical application is based on UQR or the RIF-OLS model. This
approach allows to decompose the wage equations by gender using a Oaxaca-Blinder type de-
composition in detail along the earnings distribution. The method delivers detailed information
on the drivers of the pay gap between men and women at specific quantiles. Gender wage in-
equality in the sample is estimated by the change in the GPGs across the wage distribution,
i.e. the 90-10, 90-50 and 50-10 wage gap. The estimation is based on linear RIF regressions, as
potential misspecification problems of the RIF-OLS are negligible. The method based on UQRs
has several advantages compared to CQR models as for example its intuitive and computation-
ally easy estimation as well as interpretation. However, CQRs are the standard approach in the
quantile-regression literature (Fortin et al., 2011). As the work decision may impact differently
on men’s and women’s (log) hourly wages along the earnings distribution, the method is extended
in order to allow for sample selection. By adding selection terms as second-order polynomials
to the earnings equation, the estimation results are adjusted for potential non-random selection
into employment (Buchinsky, 1998). The selection correction focuses on semiparametric models
as the selection process may be non-normally distributed (Martins, 2001). Indeed, a two-point
wild-bootstrap test, based on Horowitz and Ha¨rdle (1994) and comparing the parametric and
semiparametric binary choice models, rejects the parametric probit specification.
The analysis in this paper shows that different factors, such as educational attainment, la-
bor market experience and tenure, job characteristics, employment in different industries or
demographic and family background characteristics contribute differently to the GPG along the
wage distribution. In particular, by splitting the various categories in an endowments and a
coefficients part, differences in the contribution to the GPG at different quantiles are found.
Individual heterogeneity, like individual ability or personal motivation, and other unobservable
labor market characteristics (as for example differences in educational quality) contribute sta-
tistically significantly to pay differences between men and women along the wage distribution.
Moreover, we detect glass ceiling, i.e. significant differences between the GPG at the top and the
bottom or the median of the earnings distribution. In line with this, the wage penalty of being
female is highest at the top. The results suggest that it is important to consider GPGs through-
out the wage distribution and hence to go beyond the mean. This may be particularly relevant,
when it comes to policy implications. Wage structure effects of male-female differences in edu-
cational attainment are a main driver of wage inequality between the top and bottom or median
quantile, while the endowments effect of gender differences in education significantly lowers wage
inequality. Endowments effects of the set of regressors accounting for gender differences in labor
market presence across the wage distribution are particularly relevant in contributing to wage
inequality as well as a positive GPG at all quantiles. The bottom of the wage distribution is
found to be relatively more equal in terms of job characteristics and industrial and occupational
33
differences between men and women in terms of endowments. Differences in demographic and
family background characteristics between men and women across the wage distribution both
in terms of endowments and coefficients effects are less important. Most of the quantile-specific
pay gaps is accounted for by how men and women are rewarded, i.e. by the unexplained compo-
nent. This finding is in conformity with results obtained in other studies on gender differences
in pay for example Blau and Kahn (2016). On the contrary, net differences in endowments, i.e.
the total explained part, work towards a reduction of the phenomenon of glass ceiling as well
as of the GPGs at the corresponding quantiles. According to which selection adjustment model
(parametric or semiparametric) is chosen, the correction terms contribute differently to the
quantile-specific GPGs. Yet, in all model specifications, the main pattern of results remains the
same. The unexplained part is overestimated at the bottom and median but underestimated at
the top of the wage distribution. The extension proposed, to the author’s best knowledge, is the
first approach allowing to control for selection issues when conducting detailed Oaxaca-Blinder
type decompositions based on UQRs along the wage distribution.
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A Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
The standard approach in decomposing wage differences between groups is the Oaxaca (1973)
and Blinder (1973) decomposition approach outlined in the following:
Y¯M − Y¯F = X¯M βˆM − X¯F βˆF
= (X¯M − X¯F )βˆM + X¯F (βˆM − βˆF ) (A.1)
where Y¯M and Y¯F are the log hourly wages for the male and female sample evaluated at the
mean, respectively, with X¯G being a 1 × K vector of average characteristics and βˆG being a
K × 1 vector of estimated coefficients for G = (F,M), with M = Male and F = Female. Define
Y¯M − Y¯F = ∆ˆ and (X¯M − X¯F )βˆM = ∆ˆE as well as X¯F (βˆM − βˆF ) = ∆ˆC , with E identifying the
Endowments Effect and C the Coefficients Effect. The endowments effect, ∆ˆE , evaluates the
GPG in terms of differences in observable characteristics given male prices. The standard case
that is applied here uses male coefficients, βˆM , as the non-discriminatory wage structure and
hence assumes no discrimination against men. The second term, ∆ˆC , i.e the coefficients part or
the adjusted GPG, evaluates the pay gap in terms of different returns for female characteristics.
Table A.1 shows the result from the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean
without and with sample selection correction (column (1) and (2), respectively). For selection
correction, the standard Heckman (1979) two-step procedure is applied. The selection compo-
nent is significant only in terms of the endowments effect and adjusts both the total explained
and total unexplained part only slightly. In absolute terms both parts are corrected downwards.
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Table A.1: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition at the
Mean without and with Selection
(1) (2)
No Selection Selectiona
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.118***
(0.005)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.001) (0.001)
Experience Tenure 0.035*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002)
Job Char -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Occupations Industry -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
Selection 0.003**
(0.001)
Total Explained -0.007 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Coefficients Effect
Education 0.004 0.005
(0.011) (0.013)
Experience Tenure 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.012) (0.013)
Job Char 0.016 0.016
(0.023) (0.023)
Occupations Industry -0.004 -0.006
(0.031) (0.031)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.029 -0.032
(0.052) (0.053)
Selection 0.010
(0.040)
Total Unexplained 0.124*** 0.123***
(0.006) (0.006)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
a The selection components are estimated via the classical
Heckman two-step correction method (Heckman, 1979).
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B Reweighted-Regression Decomposition
If the assumed linearity in the RIF model does not hold, the model is misspecified and the
decomposition components are incorrect. Adding a reweighting scheme solves this problem. The
reweighted-regression decomposition using the reweighting approach proposed by DiNardo et al.
(1996) consists in performing two Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions; one for the endowments and
one for the coefficients effect.38 In order to use men as the non-discriminatory wage structure,
the sample of men is reweighted to the sample of women, indicated by the index rew. The
method uses a semiparametric reweighting factor and creates a counterfactual framework by
reweighting men’s characteristics to be as women’s. The marginal and unconditional wage
distribution YM |DM is derived via the law of iterated probabilities by integrating the conditional
distribution of wages observed for men given the set of observable characteristics X, FYM |X,DM
over the male marginal distribution of X:
FYM |DM (Y ) =
∫
FYM |X,DM (Y |X = x)dFX|DM (x) (B.1)
FY rewM :X=X|DF (Y ) =
∫
FYM |X,DM (Y |X = x)Ψ(X)dFX|DM (x)
=
∫
FYM |X,DM (Y |X = x)dFX|DF (x) (B.2)
where the dummy variable DG with G = M,F identifies group membership, for M = Male
and F = Female and Ψ(X) is the reweighting factor. It reweights female observations and
is derived using the predicted probability of belonging to the male sample, i.e. being male,
given X, Pr(X|DM = 1). The reweighting factor Ψ(X) = dFXF (X)dFXM (X) is the ratio of the marginal
distributions of X for women F and men M . As Ψ(X) is simply a function of X, it can be
derived using the predicted probability of being a woman given X, Pr(X|DF = 1), i.e. via
standard probit or logit. Since dFXF (X) = Pr(X|DF = 1) and dFXM (X) = Pr(X|DF = 0),
the reweighting factor can be re-written as:
Ψ(X) =
Pr(X|DF = 1)
Pr(X|DF = 0) =
Pr(DF = 1|X)Pr(DF = 0)
Pr(DF = 0|X)Pr(DF = 1) (B.3)
In order to obtain Pr(X|DF = 1), a probit regression for the pooled sample is run. In the
probit estimation, all regressors used in the decomposition, as well as a set of interaction terms
between educational dummies, experience and occupations (as a proxy for tasks) are included.
In particular, for the detailed decomposition, besides the reweighting factor described in equa-
38The application of other reweighting procedures is possible. For example, propensity score reweighting could
be used (Hirano et al., 2003). Here the method proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) is used as it relies minimally on
functional form assumptions. Alternatively, the model proposed by Ghosh (2014) could be used as the reweigthing
may have relatively poor finite sample performance.
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tion (B.3), for each covariate k (with k = 1, 2, . . . ,K) a reweighting factor using all covariates
except Xk is estimated:
Ψk(XK−k) =
Pr(XK−k|DF = 1)
Pr(XK−k|DF = 0) =
Pr(DF = 1|XK−k)Pr(DF = 0)
Pr(DF = 0|XK−k)Pr(DF = 1) (B.4)
The counterfactual statistic of each covariate k is obtained by using the product of the reweight-
ing factors (B.3) and (B.4), Ψ(X)Ψk(XK−k), as weights (instead of using only Ψ(X) as weight).
The counterfactual statistic is then subtracted from Ψ(X) yielding the contribution of each co-
variate k (Fortin et al., 2011). As the effect on the single covariates is estimated conditional on
all other covariates, the method is path independent.
In order to obtain a detailed decomposition in the sense of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973),
in a first stage, the distributional changes are estimated separately for an endowments and a
coefficients effect. In a second stage, the two effects are further divided into the contribution of
each set of covariates (or each covariate) using the RIF-regression model outlined in Section 2.1.
The endowments effect is obtained by decomposing the wage gap between the male and the
reweighted sample:
∆ˆE,R = ∆ˆE,p + ∆ˆE,e
= (X¯M − X¯rewM )βˆM,τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure Endowments Effect
+ X¯rewM (βˆM,τ − βˆrewM,τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Specification Error
(B.5)
where p indicates the pure effect, e the part attributed to the error term and R the to-
tal effect when reweighting is conducted. The index E identifies again the Endowments Ef-
fect. The specification error in the linear model is equal to zero, if the model is truly linear;
X¯rewM (βˆM,τ− βˆrewM,τ ) = 0. Differences between the detailed reweighted RIF-decomposition and the
RIF decomposition without reweighting are caught by the specification error. These differences
can be measured as the difference between the coefficients effect from the model without and
with reweigthing (specification error). The additional term in the (total) endowments compo-
nent, the specification error, allows to draw conclusions on the goodness of specification of the
linear model (the specification error is zero if the model is truly linear). Hence, it adjusts the
endowments component, when the linear model is not accurately specified. In another Oaxaca-
Blinder type decomposition, the coefficients part is calculated. The decomposition is conducted
between the reweighted sample, rew, and the female sample, F :
∆ˆC,R = ∆ˆC,p + ∆ˆC,e
= X¯F (βˆ
rew
M,τ − βˆF,τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure Coefficients Effect
+ (X¯rewM − X¯F )βˆrewM,τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reweighting Error
(B.6)
≈ X¯F (βˆrewM,τ − βˆF,τ )
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where the index C identifies the Coefficients Effect. The reweighting error, (X¯rewM − X¯F )βˆrewM,τ ,
goes to zero given that the following property of large samples holds: plim(X¯rewF ) = plim(X¯M )
leading to ∆ˆC,e → 0 as N →∞.39
For the quantile-specific reweighted decomposition outcome and the reweighted wage in-
equality measures shown in Table B.1 and Table B.2, respectively, the pure endowments and
coefficients effect are referred to as Total Explained or Total Unexplained. The application of a
reweighting approach may be particularly important when considering RIF regressions as they
might not be linear for distributional statistics besides the mean (Fortin et al., 2011). Advantages
of the reweighting scheme applied here are the low dependence on functional form assumptions
of the (flexible) probit for gender effects and that the procedure yields efficient estimates (Fortin
et al., 2011).
39Given that the reweighting function has been correctly specified.
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Table B.1: RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Reweight-
ing
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
F(X) in male sample F(X) in male sample F(X) in male sample
reweighted to reweighted to reweighted to
female sample female sample female sample
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Job Characteristics 0.013*** -0.007*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Occupations and Industries -0.002 -0.007*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.003*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Explained 0.025*** 0.004 -0.010
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.024 -0.015 0.146***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.025)
Experience -0.070*** -0.009 0.043*
(0.027) (0.010) (0.024)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.005 0.089*
(0.053) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.364*** 0.031 0.116*
(0.073) (0.028) (0.064)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.175* -0.059 -0.212**
(0.100) (0.038) (0.090)
Total Unexplained 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.160***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Specification Error -0.007 0.003 0.05
Reweighting Error 0.016 0.005 0.041
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Notes: The Total Unexplained parts from the model without and with reweighting are not
statistically significantly different from each other at the 10th and 50th percentile of the wage
distribution but statistically significantly different at the 90th percentile. Similarly, the Total
Explained components with and without reweighting are not statistically significantly different
at the bottom and median but statistically significantly different at the top. The difference
between the respective parts has been tested using a two-sample t-test.
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Table B.2: Gender Wage Inequality – RIF-OLS Decomposition Results with Reweighting
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
F(X) in F(X) in F(X) in
male sample male sample male sample
reweighted to reweighted to reweighted to
female sample female sample female sample
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Detailed Endowments Effect
Education -0.017*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Experience 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Job Characteristics -0.038*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Occupations and Industries -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.003 -0.000 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Total Explained -0.035*** -0.014*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Detailed Coefficients Effect
Education 0.170*** 0.161*** 0.009
(0.037) (0.027) (0.030)
Experience 0.113*** 0.052** 0.061**
(0.036) (0.026) (0.029)
Job Characteristics 0.100 0.084 0.017
(0.071) (0.052) (0.057)
Occupations and Industries 0.480*** 0.085 0.396***
(0.097) (0.070) (0.078)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.387*** -0.154 -0.234**
(0.135) (0.098) (0.107)
Total Unexplained 0.045** 0.063*** -0.018*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Specification Error 0.057 0.047 0.01
Reweighting Error 0.005 0.016 -0.011
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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C Asymptotic Normality of the RIF-OLS Model with Semipara-
metric Estimators for Selection Correction
We assume that the following model using only the observed data yields biased parameters:
RIF (Y ;Qτ ) = Xβτ + uτ (C.1)
as
E[RIF (Y ;Qτ )|X,E = 1] = Xβτ + E[uτ |vτ > −Zγ] (C.2)
with E[uτ |vτ > −Zγ] 6= 0. Firpo et al. (2009a) derive the asymptotic properties of the RIF-
OLS. In the following, the asymptotic normality as derived in Firpo et al. (2009a) is extended
for the model with selection correction. Recall that, in the case of semiparametric estimators
for selection correction, the RIF-OLS regression model corrected for selection bias at τ has the
following form:
R̂IF (Y ;Qτ ) = Xβˆτ + hˆ
∗
τ (mˆ
∗) + ˆτ
= Xβˆτ + δˆ
∗
1τλ
∗(Z∗Aγ
∗)1 + δˆ∗2τλ
∗(Z∗Aγ
∗)2 + ˆτ (C.3)
where X is a vector of K regressors, ˆτ is the quantile-specific residual.
40 βˆτ is the corresponding
vector of coefficient estimates at τ . λ∗(Z∗Aγ
∗) is the IMR and λ∗(Z∗Aγ
∗)2 is the quadratic term of
the IMR, δˆ∗1τ and δˆ∗2τ are the corresponding coefficient estimates. We assume that the wage model
in (C.3) yields consistent and unbiased parameter estimates and hence successfully corrects for
sample selection. For each observation i, we have:
R̂IF (Yi;Qτ ) = Xiβˆτ + δˆ
∗
1τλ
∗
i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗) + δˆ∗2τλ
∗
i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)2 + ˆiτ
where Xi has dimension 1×K and Yi is a scalar with sample size i = 1, . . . , N . Following Firpo
et al. (2009a), the regression of the RIF-function on Xi, λ
∗
i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗) and λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)2 yields the
following βˆτ coefficient vector
41
βˆτ =
ζˆ(Qˆτ )
fY (Qˆτ )
with dimension K × 1 and where fY (Qˆτ ) is the kernel density estimator and
ζˆ(Qˆτ ) = Ω
−1
X
1
N
N∑
i=1
{
X ′i
(
qˆτ + 1{Yi > Qˆτ} − (1− τ)
)}
40For simplicity, λ∗(Z∗Aγ
∗)1 = λ∗(Z∗Aγ
∗) in the following.
41Firpo et al. (2009a) consider the regression of the RIF-function on Xi in the model without selection
correction.
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with
ΩX =
1
N
N∑
i=1
X ′iXi and qˆτ = QˆτfY (Qˆτ )
−1
Consequently, as δˆ∗1τ and δˆ∗2τ are the coefficient estimates obtained from the RIF-OLS re-
gression of R̂IF (·) on Xi, λ∗i (Z∗Aγ∗) and λ∗i (Z∗Aγ∗)2, we have:
δˆ∗1τ =
ηˆ1(Qˆτ )
fY (Qˆτ )
δˆ∗2τ =
ηˆ2(Qˆτ )
fY (Qˆτ )
with
ηˆ1(Qˆτ ) = Ω
−1
λ∗
1
N
N∑
i=1
{
λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)
(
qˆτ + 1{Yi > Qˆτ} − (1− τ)
)}
Ωλ∗ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)′λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)
and
ηˆ2(Qˆτ ) = Ω
−1
λ∗2
1
N
N∑
i=1
{
λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)2
(
qˆτ + 1{Yi > Qˆτ} − (1− τ)
)}
Ωλ∗2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)2
′
λ∗i (Z
∗
Aγ
∗)2
Then, we have:
√
Nh(
ˆ˜
βτ − β˜τ ) D−→ N(0, VOLS)
with
ˆ˜
βτ =
 βˆτδˆ1τ
δˆ2τ
 and X˜ = (X,λ∗(Z∗Aγ∗), λ∗(Z∗Aγ∗)2)
having dimension K + 1 + 1 × 1, where K + 1 + 1 = K∗ and VOLS = VOLS(Qτ , κ) with κ(·)
being a real-value kernel function and positive bandwidth h. Following Firpo et al. (2009a), the
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asymptotic variance can then be represented as:
VOLS(Qτ , κ) = lim
h↓0
{
1
f2y (Qτ )
β˜τ β˜
′
τE[(fy(Qτ ))
2]+
= +
1
f2y (Qτ )
V ar[
√
hΩ˜−1
X˜
X˜u(Qτ ) + β˜τ (qτ + 1{Y > Qτ} − (1− τ))]
}
where
Ω˜X˜ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
X˜ ′iX˜i
u(Qτ ) = qτ + 1{Y > Qτ} − (1− τ))− X˜iζ˜(Qτ )
and
ζ˜(Qτ ) =
 ζτ (Qτ )η1τ (Qτ )
η2τ (Qτ )

The kernel density estimator, fˆy(Qˆτ ), has an asymptotic squared bias that will go faster to
zero than the variance (Firpo et al., 2009a). A possible estimator of VOLS(Qτ , κ) is VˆOLS(Qˆτ , hκ)
(see Firpo et al., 2009a). Assuming that E[u(Qτ )|X˜] = 0 and β˜τ = UQPEτ , then:
plimh↓0 VˆOLS(Qˆτ , h, κ) = VOLS(Qτ , κ)
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D The RIF-OLS Model with Parametric Estimators for Selec-
tion Correction
If the selection process is assumed to be normally distributed, the probit model can be used
for selection adjustment. Following Heckman (1979), the RIF-OLS model corrected for sample
selection using a parametric estimator for sample correction is:
R̂IF (Y ;Qτ ) = Xβˆτ + δˆτλ(ZAγˆ) + ˆτ (D.1)
where λ(ZAγˆ) is the standard IMR evaluated at ZAγˆ, δˆτ is the corresponding coefficient estimate
and ˆτ is the quantile-specific residual. Asymptotic normality of the RIF-OLS model corrected
for sample selection using a parametric estimator follows from the proof provided by Heckman
(1979) for the parametric Heckman estimator at the mean.
The components of the quantile-specific GPG adjusted for selection with the parametric
selection correction term are provided in Table D.1. The effect of the estimated selection part
due to differences in endowments is less strong compared to the results obtained in Section 4.5
but points generally in the same direction; positive at the bottom, negative at the top of the
earnings distribution. At the median no effect is found in the model with parametric selection
correction. Differences in the selection effect in terms of the unexplained part have again smaller
point estimates but the same sign. Except for the median, where the selection effect is slightly
negative in the parametric selection correction approach. Table D.2 shows that gender differences
in unobservables (given same prices) do not differ significantly across the wage distribution when
the parametric correction approach is applied. Similarly, differences in prices between men and
women to the same set of unobservables from higher to lower quantiles do not significantly
impact on the variation of the GPG across the distribution.
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Table D.1: RIF-OLS Detailed Decomposition at Different Quantiles with Selection – Probit
(1) (2) (3)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
GPG (Unadjusted Gap) 0.117*** 0.100*** 0.179***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Endowments Effect
Education -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Experience 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Characteristics 0.006 -0.004* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Occupations and Industries 0.001 -0.001 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Socio-Demographic Background -0.005** -0.009*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Selection 0.004** 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Total Explained 0.012 -0.000 -0.032***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Coefficients Effect
Education -0.024 -0.026** 0.092***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.026)
Experience 0.012 0.025** 0.121***
(0.027) (0.010) (0.025)
Job Characteristics -0.011 0.008 0.116**
(0.052) (0.020) (0.048)
Occupations and Industries -0.293*** 0.051** 0.225***
(0.070) (0.026) (0.062)
Socio-Demographic Background 0.082 -0.025 -0.116
(0.135) (0.052) (0.130)
Selection 0.110 0.006 -0.064
(0.080) (0.030) (0.071)
Total Unexplained 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.211***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table D.2: Gender Wage Inequality – Selection Component using Parametric Selection Correc-
tion
(1) (2) (3)
90-10 90-50 50-10
Probit
Unadjusted Change 0.062*** 0.079*** -0.018**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Endowments Effect
Selection -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Coefficients Effect
Selection 0.174 -0.070 -0.104
(0.107) (0.077) (0.088)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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E Definition of Variables
Table E.1: Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Lhwage The natural logarithm of net hourly wages; hourly wages in Euros,
net of taxes and social security contributions
E (Employment) One if the respective individual is in employment, zero otherwise
Independent Variables
Dummy and Interaction Effects
female One if the respective individual is a woman, zero otherwise
Education× Experience Quadratic interactions between educational dummies (Elementary School ,
High School , University Degree) and experience (Exper)
Education×Occupation Quadratic interactions between educational dummies (Elementary School,
High School , University Degree) and occupational dummies (Manager,
Intermediate Prof)
Experience×Occupation Quadratic interactions between experience (Exper) and occupational
dummies (Manager , Intermediate Prof )
Education
Elementary School One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is
Elementary School, zero otherwise
High School One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is High School,
zero otherwise; High School corresponds to 13 years of schooling
University Degree One if the highest educational attainment of the individual is
University Degree, zero otherwise
Max D Mark One if the best degree mark was attained (conditional on having a
University Degree), i.e. 110 e lode, zero otherwise
Experience
Exper Number of years of prior work experience of the individual
Exper2 Exper squared
Tenure Number of years the individual has worked for his or her current employer
Job Characteristics
Work Climate Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working climate at
the individual’s current job ∈ (0, 4)
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work Stab Individual’s level of satisfaction with the stability of the individual’s
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current job ∈ (0, 4), where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction
and 0 the lowest
Work Time Individual’s level of satisfaction with the working time at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0, 4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Work Task Individual’s level of satisfaction with the tasks at the individual’s
current job ∈ (0, 4),
where 4 is the highest level of satisfaction and 0 the lowest
Part One if the individual holds a part-time contract, zero otherwise
Contract Type One if the individual holds an unlimited contract, zero otherwise
Occupations and Industries
Manager Intellectual professions; scientific, and highly specialized occupations
Intermediate Prof Intermediary positions in commercial, technical or administrative sectors,
health services and technicians
Sec 02 - Sec 15 Sectoral dummies for employment in the following sectors or industries:
manufacturing, energy, construction, tourism, commerce, transport,
communication, financial activities, service industry, public administration,
education, health, sciences and family services, respectively
Socio-Demographic Background
Age Age of the individual (in years) ∈ (18, 64)
Age5064 One if the age of the individual is between fifty and sixty-four years,
zero otherwise
North One if the individual lives and works in the North of Italy, zero otherwise
Centre One if the individual lives and works in the Centre of Italy, zero otherwise
Homeowner One if the individual owns a house
(including houses financed by bank loans), zero otherwise
Partner Works One if the partner or the spouse of the individual is employed,
zero otherwise
Married One if the individual is married, zero otherwise
Italian One if the individual is Italian, zero otherwise
Educ Moth Uni One if the mother of the individual holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Educ Fath Uni One if the father of the individual holds a university degree, zero otherwise
Kids One if the individual has at least one child, zero otherwise
Kids 10 One if the age of the youngest child of the individual is less than ten years,
zero otherwise
Year 1-Year 5 Year dummies, one if year = 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, respectively,
and zero otherwise
Selection
λ Measures the selection bias from the employment decision
53
F Regression Output OLS, UQR and CQR
Table F.1: OLS, UQR and CQR of Log Hourly Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile
OLS UQR CQR UQR CQR UQR CQR
female -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.106*** -0.112*** -0.181*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
Elementary School -0.073*** -0.009 -0.040* -0.065*** -0.080*** -0.108*** -0.042
(0.019) (0.044) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.031) (0.036)
High School 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.205*** 0.126***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009)
University Degree 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.193*** 0.312*** 0.258***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.021) (0.013)
Max D Mark 0.032* 0.054** 0.086*** 0.042*** 0.025** 0.013 0.008
(0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (0.035) (0.028)
Exper 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Exper2 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Work Climate -0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Work Stab 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Work Time 0.013*** 0.004 0.005 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Work Task 0.010*** 0.001 -0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Part 0.036*** -0.046** -0.040*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 0.098***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Contract Type 0.075*** 0.204*** 0.180*** 0.050*** 0.040*** -0.017 0.017
(0.007) (0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Intermed Prof 0.055*** 0.086*** 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.047***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Manager 0.116*** 0.034* 0.039** 0.083*** 0.120*** 0.303*** 0.188***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.016)
North 0.056*** 0.177*** 0.103*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Centre 0.025*** 0.132*** 0.071*** -0.007 0.013** -0.005 0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
Italian -0.001 0.086 0.002 -0.005 -0.020 -0.080* -0.067
(0.023) (0.055) (0.042) (0.019) (0.017) (0.044) (0.046)
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Married 0.067*** 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.092*** 0.074***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010)
Homeowner 0.029*** 0.076*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.043***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008)
Educ Fath Uni 0.026** -0.026 -0.021 0.021** 0.033*** 0.073*** 0.039**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.009) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018)
Educ Moth Uni 0.005 0.042 0.018 0.014 0.002 -0.018 0.026
(0.015) (0.032) (0.026) (0.011) (0.008) (0.028) (0.021)
Constant 1.418*** 0.616*** 0.959*** 1.589*** 1.500*** 1.825*** 1.861***
(0.032) (0.082) (0.053) (0.023) (0.025) (0.066) (0.061)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, 100 replications, for UQR and CQR
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